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MALPRACTICE DURING PRACTICE: SHOULD NCAA
COACHES BE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE?
"Fatigue makes cowards of us all. "
"Rashidi was two players ahead of me in line. I never saw
Rashidi go down, because I collapsed and fell unconscious, too.
I got up, threw up and was as happy as I've ever been that I
passed Then I heard someone say, 'Rashidi lost his pulse. '2
I. INTRODUCTION
On a humid, Midwestern summer day, while many remained indoors
to avoid the unbearable heat, the Northwestern University football team
attempted to complete a sprinting drill during a voluntary preseason
practice. Randy Walker, the team's coach and creator of this endurance
challenge, was not present,4 as the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") Bylaws dictate.5 However, a video camera recorded the drill
6
so Coach Walker could assess each player's performance.7 Unfortunately,
this footage also documented the last living moments of twenty-two year
old Northwestern safety Rashidi Wheeler, who collapsed around 4:00 P.M.
8
1. Vince Lombardi Quotes to Inspire You, at http://www.cyber-nation.com/victory/
quotations/authors/quotes-lombardivince.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
2. Lance Pugmire & Mike Davis, Northwestern Safety Dies at 22, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2001, at DI (quoting Jason Wright, a Northwestern running back).
3. See Lance Pugmire & David Wharton, In Grief a Searchfor Answers: College Football,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at DI.
4. Id.
5. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2001-02 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art.
17.02.13, at 222 (2001) [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS]. "NCAA rules, which were changed last
spring, require any preseason workout to be voluntary. Trainers and strength and conditioning
staff may be present, but the coaching staff may not. Results of any workouts are not to be
reported to the coaching staff." NCAA Reviewing Northwestern Report of Wheeler's Death,
SPORTINGNEWS.COM (Oct. 10, 2001), http://www.sportingnews.com/cfootball/articles/20011010/
350213.html [hereinafter NCAA Reviewing Northwestern Report].
6. Alan Abrahamson, Drive to Excel Brings Death to the Gridiron, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2001, at Al.
7. See NCAA Reviewing Northwestern Report, supra note 5. "Though the workout was
voluntary, results of the drill-as well as results of earlier weightlifting and sprint drills-were
reported to the coaching staff, a violation of NCAA rules." Id.
8. Pugmire & Davis, supra note 2.
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and later died of bronchial asthma.9 Even as Wheeler gasped for his last
breath, and efforts to revive him on the field failed, the drill continued.1 °
Only a week earlier, eighteen-year-old Eraste Autin, a University of
Florida football player, died of heatstroke after a similar preseason workout
when his body temperature had soared to 108 degrees.1" On that day, the
temperature in Gainesville, Florida was eighty-eight degrees with seventy-
two percent humidity, or the equivalent of 102 degrees. 12 Yet the coach
and his staff planned the workout during the midday summer heat, a time
when most doctors warn against exercising at all.
13
The National Center for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research in North
Carolina currently documents 105 heat-related high school and college
football deaths 4 since 1955.5 Nevertheless, in the last year sixteen
football players have died while participating in this nationally admired and
passionately venerated sport.' 6  Some ask, "[w]hat kind of
sport... requires conditioning drills so rigorous that... [an] athlete dies in
February, six months before he was to play his first competitive down of
college football?"'
17
Practice-related fatalities raise legal issues within the context of
college athletics. Lawsuits implicating negligent conduct by coaches, staff,
medical personnel, and schools indicate the growing concern for the health
and safety of student-athletes. 18 Assumption of risk and comparative fault
9. Pugmire & Wharton, supra note 3.
10. Abrahamson, supra note 6.
11. Wayne Drehs, Is There Anything Else That Can Be Done?, at http://espn.go.com/ncf/s/
2001/0730/1232996.html (July 30, 2001).
12. Id.
13. See Bill Plaschke, It's Time to Start Turning Up the Heat on Demanding, Tough-Guy
Coaches, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at DI. The author quotes Rob Huizenga, team doctor for the
Los Angeles Raiders from 1983 to 1990: 'Why do we need to practice in the heat? .... It is
ludicrous. It is nonsensical. It's like some fraternity thing. It's hazing."' Id.
14. "College" and "university" will hereinafter be used interchangeably.
15. Annual Survey of Football Injury Research Data, National Center for Catastrophic Sport
Injury Research, at http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/FootballlnjuryData.htm (last updated Jan. 3 1,
2002).
16. Ben Bolch & Gary Klein, Banning Player Dies of Cardiac Arrest, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2001, at Dl; see Mike Penner, Summer of Tragedy: Rash of Player Deaths Prompts
Reexamination of Our Obsession with Football, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, at DI. The ages of
the deceased ranged from thirteen to thirty-four years old. Id.
17. Penner, supra note 16 (discussing the death of Florida State freshman linebacker
Devaughn Darling during an off-season conditioning drill).
18. See Rob Femas, School's Actions Are Key to Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2001, at DI
(discussing the legal contentions in the suit by the mother of Rashidi Wheeler against
Northwestern University); see also Steve Springer, Family Plans to Sue over Darling Death, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at DI (discussing the legal contentions in the suit by Devaughn Darling's
family against Florida State University).
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theories have limited recovery for football and heatstroke-related deaths.1 9
Several factors in current college sports, however, demand reassessment of
the standard of care that colleges owe student-athletes. 20 The NCAA rules
consider these preseason practices to be voluntary,21 but players'
performance and completion of these conditioning drills determine the
extent of their playing time and participation on the team.22 Therefore, the
importance of participating in "voluntary" drills inhibits the student-
athlete's freedom of choice, even if completion may be harmful.
23
This Comment asserts that the standard of care that college coaches
owe student-athletes must be raised to avoid unreasonably exposing their
players to injury or death. Part II of this Comment presents the basic
elements of negligence and applies the principles of negligence to college
athletics, demonstrating the rationales courts traditionally have used to
deny plaintiffs recovery from schools for student-athlete deaths. Part III
provides specific cases that recognize the existence of a special relationship
between the coach of a college athletic team and a student-athlete,
demanding a heightened duty to avoid foreseeable harm. Part IV contends
that the recruitment practices for student-athletes, the unreasonable
pressure to succeed, and the public policy concerns surrounding these
untimely deaths establish a necessity to enforce a heightened duty. Finally,
Part V concludes that breach of this heightened duty should result in the
liability of coaches and schools involved in negligence suits.
II. APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
COACH AND UNIVERSITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR STUDENT-ATHLETE
DEATHS
Tort liability arises when one person injures another.24 Although the
injury may have been unintentional, a court may hold the person
responsible whose action or inaction caused the injury. Courts apply
19. See Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal Liability of
Coaches for a Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 43-66 (1996); see also
discussion infra Part Il.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
21. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 17.02.1, at 219-20 (identifying and defining
athletically-related activities included in the general playing season). Voluntary conditioning
drills do not fall within this section, but they must follow the guidelines in article 17.02.13. Id.
art. 17.02.13, at 222.
22. Andrew Bagnato, Coaches More Cautious in Heat Than in the Past: Recent Tragedies
Change Thinking, CUt. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2001, at 4:6.
23. See id.
24. GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW § 7, at 176 (1986).
25. Id. § 7.2(A), at 178.
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principles of negligence in assessing tort liability when a defendant's
conduct fails to meet the legal standard designated to protect against
unreasonable risks.z6 The appropriate conduct of a reasonable person under
the same or similar circumstances sets this standard of law.27 However,
courts extend the scope of duty beyond this standard of reasonable care if a
special relationship existed between the parties at the time of the injury.
28
Furthermore, courts assign liability for negligence to an employer under a
theory of vicarious liability if its employee committed the tort.29
Application of these principles to collegiate athletics, especially a contact
sport like football, makes tort liability difficult to determine due to the
prevalence of injuries.30  Nevertheless, decisions defining the respective
duties of student-athletes and coaches-as agents of a university3 '-have
allowed for the development of negligence liability in the context of
collegiate sports.32
A. Standard Application of Negligence
1. Negligence Defined
A cause of action for negligence requires the following elements: (1)
a duty of care based on the standard of a reasonable person in a similar or
identical situation;33 (2) a breach of duty by failing to act consistently with
the standard of care; 34 (3) a breach of the duty of care substantially causing
the injury;35 and (4) actual damages or injury resulting from the breach.
36
The minimum duty of care requires a person to avoid creating
unreasonable risks of injury to others.37 This minimum level of care can
escalate to a duty to aid or protect depending on the circumstances of the
26. JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.02, at 933-34 (1979).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
28. Walter T. Champion, The Evolution of a Standard of Care for Injured College Athletes:
A Review of Kleinknecht and Progeny, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 290, 296 (1999); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. a.
29. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
30. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 26, § 8.01, at 933.
31. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(D), at 202-03.
32. Id. § 7.1, at 177.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283.
34. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(A)(1)(b), at 181.
35. Id. § 7.2(A)(1)(c), at 185.
36. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 14.
37. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(A)(1), at 178.
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relationship between the tortfeasor and victim, and the nature of the harm.3 8
For example, courts generally apply a higher standard of care to coaches,
teachers, and administrators 39 because they can use their authority to put
subordinates in potentially harmful activities, 40 which also places them in
the best position to prevent their subordinates' injuries.4' Consequently,
courts impose a heightened duty of care on authority figures, especially
when those in control supervise or conduct an inherently dangerous
activity.42 Therefore, the special relationship between an authority figure
and a subordinate imposes a duty of care to protect against those risks that
the authority figure did not create.43
Evidence that a defendant's conduct failed to conform to the requisite
duty will satisfy the second element of negligence: breach. 44 "If a person
realizes or should realize that their conduct exposes another to the
unreasonable risk of injury from third parties, animals or forces of nature,
then he or she will be negligent for acting in that manner. 4 5 A defendant
who creates an unreasonable risk breaches the duty of reasonable care,
satisfying the second element of negligence.46
A plaintiff must also establish a causal link from the breach in
question to the injury.47 A defendant's negligence does not have to be the
only factor to cause the resulting harm.4 8 If breaching the duty of
reasonable care constitutes a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiffs injury, the defendant will be liable for all of those injuries,
including injuries caused merely by aggravating the plaintiffs preexisting
condition.49 In sum, the type of injury or the manner in which the
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A. This section identifies common carriers,
innkeepers, possessors of land, and those required by law to protect others as the special relations
necessitating a heightened duty. Id.
39. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(A)(1)(a), at 179.
40. Id. § 7.4, at 220. The American Law Institute noted that this section does not limit the
types of special relationships; rather, courts have discretion to define other relationships as special
and requiring a heightened duty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A.
41. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.4, at 220.
42. See id. § 7.4(A), at 220 ("Greater care must be exercised if the participant is required to
come in contact with an inherently dangerous object, or to engage in an activity likely to produce
injury.").
43. See Davidson v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 543 S.E.2d 920, 927 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001).
44. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(A)(1)(b), at 181.
45. Id. at 182.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 7.2(A)(1)(c), at 183-84.
48. Id. at 184.
49. Id. at 185.
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defendant's negligence causes the injury need not be foreseeable to satisfy
the causation element of negligence.5
Finally, damages resulting from the breach, such as injury or death,
must exist to satisfy the last and most conspicuous element of negligence. 5'
Courts require that the damages profoundly impact the plaintiffs
interests.52 Thus, nominal injury or loss does not satisfy this final element
of negligence. 3
2. Vicarious Liability
When a third party employs someone who behaves negligently, that
employer may be held vicariously liable for the employee's actions.54 A
plaintiff can seek recovery from an employer if an employee commits the
tort while acting within the scope of employment. 55 Under this theory, an
injured person can bring an action for negligence against the employee
whose action or inaction caused the injury, as well as the employer.
5 6
Furthermore, the employer may be vicariously liable for negligence when
the employee is merely carrying out tasks related to employment, even if
they are performed after hours or outside of the place of business without
compensation. 7  The rationale behind permitting vicarious liability
emphasizes that employers control their employees' actions while they are
on the job. 8
50. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(A)(1)(c), at 185.
51. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW, § 1.7, at 19 (1990).
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(D), at 202. "Vicarious liability usually arises
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.., a legal theory whereby a principal is made jointly
and severally liable for the torts an agent commits." Id.
55. Id. at 203.
56. See id. '"Joint and several liability' means that one harmed by an agent's negligent
conduct may, at his or her option, sue the agent, one or more principals separately, or any
combination of agent and principals." Id.
57. Id.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219, cmt. a (1958).
The assumption of control is a usual basis for imposing tort liability when the thing
controlled causes harm.... [T]he courts of today have worked out tests which are
helpful in predicting whether there is such a relation between the parties that
liability will be imposed on the employer for the employee's conduct which is in
the scope of employment.
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B. Imposing Liability on Coaches and Schools Under a Traditional
Negligence Standard
1. Application of Negligence Elements to College Athletics
Due to the nature of their jobs, sports coaches bear the special
heightened duty of minimizing the risk of injury to all participants,
especially those under their control.59 Courts currently assess coaches'
duties by considering, for example, whether the coach provided proper
supervision, training, and instruction regarding safety procedures.6°
Coaches must insist that their players maintain safe playing habits and
adhere to the rules of the game to avoid preventable injuries, particularly in
contact sports like football.61 Additionally, coaches have a duty to warn
against all dangers that are known or "should have been discovered in the
exercise of reasonable care., 62  Because of this duty, coaches must
supervise their players proportionately to the amount of danger inherent in
the activity.63 In other words, the more dangerous the sport, the higher the
responsibility coaches bear to supervise their players. 64 Other factors in
assessing coaches' liability include whether they furnished the proper
safety equipment, provided experienced personnel and timely medical care,
and demonstrated necessary concern for players with injuries.65 Finally,
the extent of a coach's duty depends on the age of the participants, as well
as their skill and experience level.66
Sports coaches breach their special heightened duty if they do not
prevent all reasonably foreseeable risks of harm to their players.67 Because
coaches are in the best position to avoid harm,6 8 they must perform their
specific duties without creating additional risks to their players. 69 Although
coaches need not ensure the safety of their players, they must exercise the
proper care and must conduct their teams in adherence to this heightened
59. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 15.
60. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.4(A)(1)-(2), at 221-22.
61. See id. § 7.4(A)(2), at 222.
62. Id. § 7.4(A)(4), at 223-24.
63. Id. § 7.4(A)(5), at 224.
64. Id.
65. See McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 15-16.
66. Id. at 16.
67. See id. at 18.
68. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.4, at 220.
69. See id. § 7.2(A)(1)(b), at 181.
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duty.70 By requiring players to participate in drills likely to cause an injury,
a coach is in breach upon failure to provide additional supervision and
competent medical personnel to avoid this risk.7'
If the coach's action or inaction constitutes a breach of duty, and this
breach was the direct or indirect cause of the athlete's injury or death, the
plaintiff has met the third element of negligence.72 Beyond this, coaches
must protect their players from all foreseeable harm, even if the particular
harm injures the player in an unforeseeable manner.73 For instance,
coaches may not avoid liability when their breach of duty further
aggravates a player's preexisting condition, like asthma, and contributes to
subsequent injury or death.74
In sports, negligent conduct usually results in severe physical
injuries,75 exemplifying the link between causation and damages.76
Therefore, when a coach fails to provide proper instruction to avoid a
foreseeable risk and that failure results in a life-threatening injury, the
coach acts negligently.
2. Courts' Failure to Impose an Adequate Duty of Care on Coaches and
Universities to Protect Student-athletes
Currently, coaches must act as would a reasonable person in the same
or a similar situation.77 However, the majority of courts do not extend a
coach's duty beyond reasonable care.78 Coaches generally have no duty to
70. See id. § 7.4, at 220.
71. See id. § 7.4(A)(1), at 221-22. "A coach will often delegate these duties to an assistant,
but delegation does not relieve the coach of the ultimate responsibility for proper supervision."
Id. at 222; see also id. § 7.4(A)(5)-(6), at 224-25.
72. See id. § 7.2(A)(1)(c), at 183-84.
73. See id. at 185.
74. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(A)(1)(c), at 185. Generally, as a matter of
policy, courts adhere to the principle that defendants "take their victims as they find them." Id.
75. CHAMPION, supra note 51, § 1.7, at 19.
76. See id.
77. See Berg v. Merricks, 318 A.2d 220, 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Lovitt v. Concord
Sch. Dist., 228 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); McGee v. Bd. of Educ., 226 N.Y.S.2d
329, 331-32 (App. Div. 1962); Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, Malheur County, 376 P.2d 406,
414 (Or. 1962); see also Morris v. Union High Sch. Dist. A., King County, 294 P. 998, 999
(Wash. 1931) (finding liability for a coach who forced a player to compete despite knowledge of
his player's serious injuries).
78. See Champion, supra note 28, at 296-98. "We hold that a board of education, its
employees, agents and organized athletic councils must exercise ordinary reasonable care to
protect student[-]athletes voluntarily involved in extracurricular sports from unassumed,
concealed or unreasonably increased risks." Benitez v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29,
33 (N.Y. 1989).
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ensure the safety of all players under their control 79 as they must merely
maintain the specific duties set forth for coaches, which include protecting
their players from foreseeable risks.8°
The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Benitez v. New York
City Board of Education81 sets forth the traditional legal approach for
assessing coaches' liability for injuries to players. The court refused
recovery to Sixto Benitez, a high school football player who suffered a
broken neck during a varsity game.83 The coach and assistant principal of
the school knew the two teams playing were mismatched.84 Additionally,
the coach admitted to knowing that his players were fatigued and that their
fatigue could lead to injury if he continued the game against the stronger
opposing team.85 Despite the court's recognition that Benitez's chances of
a college scholarship probably compelled him to ignore a risk of injury,86
the court failed to impose a heightened duty on the coach or the school
because the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the game.
8 7
Similarly, in Orr v. Brigham Young University,88 the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit did not find a special relationship between student-
athletes and the university, thereby imposing only a minimum duty
standard. 89  Vernon Orr played varsity football for Brigham Young
University ("BYU") for two seasons and suffered multiple episodes of
painful injuries to his back during participation in practices and games.9°
He brought suit against the university, contending breach of a heightened
duty arising out of his special relationship with BYU as a student-athlete. 9'
79. SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.4, at 220.
80. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
81. 541 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1989).
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id. at 30-31.
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 33-34.
87. See Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 34. "The coach undeniably supervised plaintiff.... [T]here
was no evidence at all that plaintiff was concerned about an unreasonably heightened risk of
competition or that his coach directed him to disregard a risk he would not have otherwise
assumed anyhow." Id. at 33-34. But see discussion infra Part IV.
88. No. 96-4015, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6083 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1997).
89. Id. at *6-*7; see also Champion, supra note 28, at 296 ("[T]he courts have had real
difficulty unearthing a relationship special enough to establish a duty on the part of colleges to
either protect or administer to the injured collegian.").
90. See Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., 960 F. Supp. 1522, 1523-24 (D. Utah 1994).
91. Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., No. 96-4015, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6083, at *2 (10th
Cir. Mar. 31, 1997).
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The Tenth Circuit, relying on Beach v. University of Utah,92 affirmed the
Utah district court's grant of summary judgment for BYU and rejected
Orr's claim that universities owe a heightened duty to their student-athletes
based on a special relationship.93
Comparing the facts of Orr to the Beach case, however, reveals an
important distinction between a student-athlete who brings a negligence
claim against the university and a non-athlete student who brings a similar
claim.94 The mutual dependence between student-athletes and universities,
as well as the control universities have over student-athletes' lives, serve as
the basis of their special relationship.95 A typical private student, on the
other hand, does not make such extensive contributions to the university as
a student-athlete, so a heightened duty does not apply.96 Therefore, the Orr
court merely upheld Beach as previous precedent, not necessarily because
of its applicability to the instant case.97
3. Affirmative Defenses Readily Available to Coaches and Universities
Under a Traditional Negligence Standard
A defendant's strongest argument against a negligence claim is to
deny "any breach of duty owed ' 98 and establish that the defendant
exercised reasonable care to avoid any foreseeable risks.99 If the facts of
the case reveal a special relationship requiring a heightened duty, and the
court finds negligent conduct, the defendant may avoid liability by
contending that the injured party implicitly or expressly assumed the risk of
the harmful activity. 00 Also, a defendant may present evidence that the
injured party's actions contributed to or escalated the risk of injury,'0 ' and
the injured party should therefore be partially responsible.
10 2
92. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
93. Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., No. 96-4015, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6083, at *5-*7
(10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1997).
94. Michelle D. McGirt, Comment, Do Universities Have a Special Duty of Care to Protect
Student-athletes from Injury?, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 219, 229-37 (1999).
95. See discussion infra Part IV.
96. See McGirt, supra note 94, at 235-37.
97. See id.
98. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 43.
99. See id.
100. See Eugene C. Bjorklun, Assumption of Risk and Its Effect on School Liability for
Athletic Injuries, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY 533, 534 (Timothy Davis et
al. eds., 1999).
101. See McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 52-53.
102. See id.
MALPRACTICE DURING PRACTICE
a. Implied Assumption of Risk
A defense that a student-athlete implicitly assumed the risk of injury
requires a showing that the student-athlete: (1) had some "actual
knowledge" of a risk of injury; (2) "understood and appreciated the risk";1
0 3
and (3) "voluntarily accepted the risk."' 0 4  Moreover, student-athletes
assume only the inherent risks commonly associated with their sports, not
the extraordinary or unusual risks of harm or injury. 05 Consequently,
universities and coaches may be held liable for injuries to their players
when a breach creates risks not inherent to the sport.10 6 In other words, a
student-athlete on a university's football team assumes only foreseeable
risks as a result of voluntary participation in team-related activities.
0 7
Additionally, courts consider factors that may diminish the voluntary
aspect of a student-athlete's participation when assessing assumption of
risk claims. 0 8  For instance, a coach's instructions, comments, and
behavior can have a definite effect on a student-athlete's decision to
participate in a particular activity for which the student-athlete assumes the
inherent risks.'0 9 Thus, courts' holdings will hinge on student-athletes'
appreciation of these risks in light of the circumstances influencing their
participation. 10
b. Express Assumption of Risk: Waivers and Exculpatory Agreements
If an injured student-athlete signed an agreement expressly assuming
the risk of injury prior to participating in team-related activities, the
defendant university and its coaches may escape responsibility for their




107. See Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812, 817-18 (Ct. App.
1996).
108. See Bjorklun, supra note 100, at 534-37.
109. See Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 653, 659 (Mass. 1978). In this case, the
defendant hockey coach supplied the plaintiff student-athlete with a helmet that failed to protect
the student-athlete from head injuries when a hockey puck hit him. Id. at 656-57.
The plaintiff testified that he did not know of any dangers that he was exposed to
by wearing the helmet. He believed, he said, that it would protect his head from
injury. The helmet had been supplied to him by a person with great knowledge and
experience in hockey, a person whose judgment the plaintiff had reason to trust,
and it was given to him for the purpose implied, if not expressed, of protecting him.
Id. at 659; see McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 47.
110. See McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 47.
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allegedly negligent conduct. 1" These waivers release the university from
liability if the agreement specifically delineates the particular injury
suffered." 2  However, courts do not uphold the waivers or releases if
universities allow student-athletes to play only after they sign the
agreement. 1 3 Additionally, these agreements may be declared void if they
violate public policy." 4 Therefore, the same public interest considerations
that demand a heightened duty standard between universities and student-
athletes participating in team-related activities should void any waiver of
liability.'11
c. Comparative Negligence
Comparative negligence apportions liability based on the relative fault
of both parties when the plaintiff escalated the chance of injury by
voluntarily participating in a foreseeably harmful activity. 1 6  In a
comparative fault jurisdiction, courts assess the student-athlete's
negligence that led to injury to determine a ratio of fault. 1 7 Courts apply
the comparative negligence doctrine by assigning percentages of
responsibility based on the nature and circumstances of both parties'
conduct as well as the extent to which their conduct caused the harm."'
Hence, despite a student-athlete's participation in a "voluntary"
conditioning drill, the factors surrounding the activity and injury-not
solely the act of participation--dictate the validity of this defense.
11. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 26, § 8.04, at 965.
112. Andrew Manno, A High Price to Compete: The Feasibility and Effect of Waivers Used
to Protect Schools from Liability for Injuries to Athletes with High Medical Risks, 79 KY. L.J.
867, 870 (1991).
113. Bjorklun, supra note 100, at 536-37.
114. Manno, supra note 112, at 870; see, e.g., Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d
968, 970 (Wash. 1988) ("Courts ... are usually reluctant to allow those charged with a public
duty, which includes the obligation to use reasonable care, to rid themselves of that obligation by
contract.").
115. See Manno, supra note 112, at 870 (stating factors that may lead to a waiver being
declared void, such as when a party is a minor or when duress exists).
116. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(A)(1)(d), at 187.
117. See id. Instead of comparative negligence, some jurisdictions adhere to a contributory
negligence rule, which bars plaintiffs from recovery if courts deem them at fault. Id.; see
McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 19, at 52-53.
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 cmt. c (2000).
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III. A HEIGHTENED DUTY OF CARE: THE EMERGING TREND OF COURTS
RECOGNIZING A COACH AND UNIVERSITY'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO
STUDENT-ATHLETES
Some courts have accepted the argument that a special relationship
exists between the student-athlete and the coach or university.)9 These
decisions indicate that a heightened duty exists by virtue of the mutual
dependence between the university and the student-athlete,1 20 as well as the
university's "control and dominance over every aspect of [the] student-
athlete's collegiate life.' 21  Application of these decisions to current
concerns in college athletics programs makes the recognition of a
heightened duty imperative to protect student-athletes from high risks. 
122
A. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College
23
In Kleinknecht, the parents of a deceased student lacrosse player
convinced the Third Circuit to impose liability on the college for breaching
a heightened duty.12 4 Gettysburg College ("Gettysburg") recruited Drew
Kleinknecht to play on their intercollegiate lacrosse team. 25 During a fall
semester "skills and drills"'126 practice supervised by coaches who lacked
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") training, 127 Kleinknecht suffered a
fatal heart attack. 28 Kleinknecht had no previous medical history of heart
problems. 29 In fact, examinations by college and family physicians within
that same year revealed that Kleinknecht was in perfect health. 30 In
addition, autopsy records showed no bruises or contusions to his body,
eliminating the possibility that factors other than participation in the drills
119. Andrew Rhim, The Special Relationship Between Student-athletes and Colleges: An
Analysis of a Heightened Duty of Care for the Injuries of Student-athletes, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
329, 341 (1996).
120. Id. at 339-42.
121. Monica L. Emerick, The University/Student-athlete Relationship: Duties Giving Rise to
a Potential Educational Hindrance Claim, 44 UCLA L. REV. 865, 891 (1997).
122. See discussion infra Part IV.
123. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 1375. Under a theory of vicarious liability, the university is liable for the
negligence of its employees. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
125. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1362-63.
126. Id. at 1363.
127. Id. The college employed two full-time trainers as well as twelve student trainers, all
of whom were trained in CPR, but they were only required to attend spring semester lacrosse
practices. Id.
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caused the heart attack.13 1 Consequently, the plaintiffs attributed
Kleinknecht's death to the college's negligent act of failing to provide
medically trained staff at Kleinknecht's practice.1
32
The court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the lacrosse
coaches and trainers, as agents of Gettysburg,133 owed Kleinknecht a
special duty for three reasons.1 34  First, a special relationship existed
between Gettysburg and Kleinknecht due to his recruitment to play
lacrosse. 135  The court recognized that Kleinknecht's recruitment to
Gettysburg created a "mutual dependence" between them.1
36
"[Kleinknecht's] skill at lacrosse would bring favorable attention"'137 to the
college, while also allowing him to fulfill his desire to receive a college
education and play lacrosse. 38 Second, Gettysburg should have protected
Kleinknecht against all foreseeable harms, such as a cardiac arrest, while he
participated in team activities within the scope of his role as a student-
athlete. 139  The court limited this special duty to provide adequate
"preventive emergency measures"'140 to student-athletes only. 14' The
Kleinknechts proved the foreseeability of a life-threatening injury in a
contact sport like lacrosse. 142 Therefore, the special duty required that
Gettysburg "take reasonable precautions against the risk of death while
[Kleinknecht] was taking part in [Gettysburg's] intercollegiate lacrosse
program."'143 The court also emphasized that the fact-finder, in determining
whether the school breached its duty, must assess the foreseeability of
injury and the adequacy of safety measures. 144  Third, public policy
imposed a heightened duty on Gettysburg to reasonably protect
Kleinknecht-a recruited student-athlete-from a foreseeable injury. 45
Considerations of "[t]he hand of history,... ideas of morals and justice, the
131. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1365.
132. See id. at 1369.
133. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(D), at 202-03.
134. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1366, 1372.
135. Id. at 1366-69.
136. Rhim, supra note 119, at 343; see Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1368.
137. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1368.
138. See Rhim, supra note 119, at 343.
139. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1370.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. "In addition to the testimony of numerous medical and athletic experts, Coach
Janczyk, Head Trainer Donolli, and student trainer Moore all testified that they were aware of
instances in which athletes had died during athletic competitions." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1371-72.
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convenience of administration of the rule, and ... social ideas as to where
the loss should fall"'146 demand the enforcement of this special duty by the
courts. 1
47
B. Knapp v. Northwestern University
148
The Seventh Circuit permitted Northwestern University
("Northwestern") to deem Nicholas Knapp ineligible to play basketball on
its team because the court considered a heart attack to be a foreseeable and
unreasonable risk that the university should avoid. 149  During Knapp's
junior year in high school, recruiters from Northwestern offered him an
athletic scholarship to play basketball after he graduated. 5 ° At the
beginning of his senior year, Knapp suffered a heart attack, and doctors
implanted a cardioverter-defibrillator to jump-start his heart if it stopped
again.' 5 ' Although Northwestern promised that it would still grant him the
scholarship, 52 it did not allow him to play or practice with the team.'53 The
District Court granted an injunction against Northwestern, holding that the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protected Knapp's right to play intercollegiate
basketball. 154 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the
case, stating that Knapp's condition could not be considered a disability
under the Rehabilitation Act. 155 Furthermore, Northwestern's decision to
deny Knapp the opportunity to play on the team did not deprive him of a
"major life activity,"' 156 but rather it protected him from a risk of death. 157
146. Id. at 1372 (quoting Gardner v. Consol. Rail Corp., 573 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1990)).
147. See id.
148. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). The suit also named Rick Taylor, Northwestern
University's athletic director, as a defendant. Id.
149. Id. at 485.
150. Id. at 476.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1996).
154. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 938 F. Supp. 508, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Under the
Rehabilitation Act, "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994); see also Knapp v. Northwestern Univ.,
101 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996).
155. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485-86 (7th Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 481.
157. See id. at 485. "Northwestern's experts agreed with the school's team doctors that
Knapp's participation in competitive Big Ten basketball presented an unacceptable level of
risk. ... Almost all experts agreed that the internal defibrillator had never been tested under
conditions like an intercollegiate basketball game or practice . I. " d.at 483-84.
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The Seventh Circuit's decision implies that the athletic director, as an
agent of the university, 58 and the university itself have a special duty to
reasonably protect their student-athletes from foreseeable harms. 5 9
Northwestern adhered to this heightened duty as a result of the special
relationship it would have experienced had it permitted Knapp to play as a
student-athlete. 60  Applying the Kleinknecht rationale, the special
relationship arose from Northwestern's active recruitment of Knapp to play
basketball for the school, the foreseeable risk of injury while participating
in team-related activities, and the public policy concerns derived from
protecting student-athletes, which required Northwestern to act
accordingly.' 6' In light of this heightened duty, the court enabled
Northwestern to "make its own determinations of substantial risk and
severity of injury if they are based on reliable evidence,"162 as the
university would be required to protect Knapp from these risks if he played
on their team.
163
C. Lamorie v. Warner Pacific College
164
The Oregon Court of Appeals in Lamorie held Warner Pacific
College ("Warner Pacific") and its basketball coach, Dan Dunn, liable for
negligence because Dunn asked student-athlete Douglas Lamorie to
participate in a basketball scrimmage with the team despite Dunn's
knowledge that Lamorie's participation would likely result in injury.
165
Lamorie had an athletic scholarship to Warner Pacific, but after undergoing
surgery for an injury to his nose, his doctor recommended that he not
participate in athletic activities. 166  Less than a month after surgery,
Lamorie's nose was still swollen, his face bruised, and his vision
impaired. 167  Dunn, who knew about the doctor's instructions, asked
Lamorie to play in a team scrimmage, and Lamorie agreed even though "he
did not feel well enough."'
68
158. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(D), at 202-03.
159. Rhim, supra note 119, at 347.
160. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996).
161. Rhim, supra note 119, at 347 & n. 126.
162. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996).
163. See id.
164. 850 P.2d 401 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). The suit also named Dan Dunn, head basketball
coach at Warner Pacific College, as a defendant. Id.
165. Id. at 402.
166. Id. at 401.
167. Id. at 402.
168. Id.
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Like the plaintiff in Benitez v. New York City Board of Education,
169
Lamorie feared losing his athletic scholarship, compelling him to follow
the orders of his coach instead of his doctor. 170 However, in contrast to
Benitez, the Lamorie court recognized the coach's special duty to protect
his player from all foreseeable risks.' 71 Adopting the student-athlete's
argument, the court held: "Dunn had acted in reckless disregard of [the]
plaintiffs condition and doctor's orders in asking him to play basketball
when he knew or should have known that [the] plaintiff would feel
improperly pressured to play because of fears of losing his basketball
scholarship."'' 72 Dunn knew or should have known of the increased risk to
Lamorie because it was foreseeable that his bruised and swollen face would
impair his vision.173 Implying the special relationship between the coach
and the student-athlete, 74 the court imposed a heightened duty of care on
the coach to avoid a "risk reasonably to be anticipated."'1
7 5
D. Davidson v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
176
In Davidson, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that a special
relationship demands a heightened duty of care when a mutual dependence
exists between the university and the student-athlete, and when the
university "exert[s] a high degree of control over many aspects of a
student[-]athlete's life.' ' 177 As a member of the defendant university's
junior varsity cheerleading squad ("JV squad"), plaintiff Robin Davidson
fell approximately thirteen feet from the top of a "two-one-chair" pyramid
formation onto the hardwood floor, causing permanent brain damage and
severe bodily injury. 178 The JV squad did not have a coach or an advisor,
and the university did not provide the squad's members with safety
training, proper instruction, or supervision. 179 However, the JV squad did
receive uniforms, transportation to games and cheerleading events,
equipment, and facility use from the university, as well as physical
169. 541 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes 77-82.






176. 543 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id. at 927.
178. Id. at 922.
179. Id.
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education credit.' 80 In return for these benefits, the JV squad cheered at
various university sporting events and activities as university
representatives. 18 1 This representative status required the members of the
JV squad to uphold the specific standards set for all student-athletes at the
university, such as maintaining a minimum grade point average and
abstaining from drinking alcohol in public.
82
The court emphasized that it must determine the existence of a special
relationship on a case-by-case basis and only after weighing both factual
and public policy considerations. 83  Because the university received
significant benefits from the JV squad and provided them with the means to
continue their program, the court determined that this mutual dependence
between the university and the JV squad necessitated a special
relationship.'8 4 Accordingly, the court imposed a heightened duty on the
university to ensure the safety of the JV squad members, thereby assigning
liability to the defendant university.18 5  Furthermore, the university's
control over the student-athletes led to an expectation that the university
would provide safety measures during participation in university-related
cheerleading activities. 8 6 In other words, the plaintiff assumed that her
participation in the pyramid formation was not dangerous because the
university did not warn her about possible injury. 187  The university
breached this duty of care to the cheerleader by failing to provide proper
supervision, safety equipment, and warnings to the members of the JV
squad considering the student-athletes' age and skill level. 1
88
E. Kennedy v. Syracuse University'
8 9
Kennedy exemplified a university's adherence to a heightened duty as
a result of a special relationship with a student-athlete.' 90 Although the
court granted the defendant university's motion for summary judgment' 9'
180. Id. at 923.
181. Id.
182. Davidson, 543 S.E.2d at 923.
183. See id. at 927.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 928.
186. Id. at 927.
187. Id.
188. See Davidson, 543 S.E.2d at 928.
189. No. 94-CV-269, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13539 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1995).
190. See McGirt, supra note 94, at 221 (stating that "courts have recognized... [the]
student-college relationship as special").
191. Kennedy, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13539, at *10.
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on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to establish the proximate cause
element of his negligence claim, 192 the court chose not to dispute the
plaintiff's argument that the university breached its duty of care to the
student-athlete by failing to have an athletic trainer at a practice. 193 Russell
Kennedy, a student-athlete on the gymnastics team, brought a negligence
action against the university after fracturing both bones in his lower right
arm during a routine practice. 194 He claimed that his coaches and
teammates caused "compartment syndrome"'' 95 after they administered
improper emergency care immediately following the injury. 196 Moreover,
Kennedy argued that the university breached a duty to provide medical
trainers at his practice.' 97 Despite this alleged breach of the duty of care,
the court accepted an expert doctor's affidavit presented by the
university 198 that attributed the compartment syndrome directly to the
injury and not as a result of the treatment. 99 By deciding this case based
on Kennedy's inability to show proximate cause, the court implied that
200Kennedy met all elements of negligence except for proximate cause.
Kennedy properly showed that the university had a duty to provide a trainer
at every practice so as to reasonably avoid all foreseeable risks, and the
university breached its duty by not having a trainer at practice on the day
the plaintiff suffered the injury.
20 1
192. Id. at *8.
193. Id. at *5-*6.
194. Id. at *1-'2.
195. The compartment syndrome is "characterized by swelling of the soft tissue in the
forearm." Id. at *3.
196. Id. at *6. Kennedy needed another operation to alleviate the compartment syndrome.
Id. at *3.
197. Kennedy, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13539, at *10. "This claim is based on [the]
plaintiff's allegation that the University adopted a custom and practice of providing trainers for
all football and basketball practices and games and, as a result, it voluntarily assumed a duty to do
the same for all other sports." Id.
198. See id. at *6-*8. The plaintiff did not present evidence to refute this finding. Id. at
*5-*6. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment because the defendant met the proper
burden and the plaintiff failed to show causation. Id. at *8.
199. Id. at *6. Specifically, the injury was caused when Kennedy slammed his wrist against
the high bar. Id.
200. See id. at *5-*9. The court identified the elements of negligence and did not reject the
plaintiff's claim that the university owed Kennedy, as a student-athlete, a heightened duty of care
to have a trainer at practice to avoid foreseeable injuries. Id. at *5.
201. See id. at *10.
20021
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IV. Do OR DIE: A HEIGHTENED DUTY MUST BE IMPOSED ON COACHES
AND UNIVERSITIES
The tragic deaths of Rashidi Wheeler, Eraste Autin, and other student-
athletes as a result of their participation in intercollegiate team activities
20 2
necessitate a reexamination of the accountability of coaches and
universities under traditional elements of negligence. The three factors
enumerated in Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College20 3 and the rationale of
similar decisions related to the current conditions surrounding student-
athletes on NCAA-affiliated teams support a finding that coaches, as agents
of a university, 0 4 should be held liable when they fail to protect their
players from foreseeable injury.20 5 A heightened duty on coaches to
preserve the health and safety of their student-athletes is also necessitated
by such factors as university recruiters' appealing offers to talented high
school student-athletes, the student-athletes' enduring dedication to
contribute to the success of their college teams, and society's moral and
ethical concerns about preventing the college athlete's experience from
becoming fatal.
A. Advantage University: Corruption of the Recruitment Process
The Kleinknecht court partially based its finding that a special
relationship existed between coaches and student-athletes on the
university's active recruitment of student-athletes, justifying a heightened
duty.206 The court's rationale identified the benefits gained by universities
through the student-athletes' contributions to their teams, creating a
favorable reputation for the university.20 7 A successful sports dynasty
invites world recognition, making the university more attractive to other
potential students and student-athletes.2 8 Universities also benefit from
recruiting the best athletes because a good reputation attracts economic
success in the form of "gate proceeds, television and licensing revenues, in
addition to corporate sponsor and boosters contributions. 20 9
202. See discussion supra Part I.
203. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993).
204. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(D), at 202-03.
205. See discussion supra Part II.A.
206. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1368.
207. See id.
208. See Rhim, supra note 119, at 340.
209. Id. at 339-40.
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In return for these precious benefits, universities promise student-
athletes a college education, a full scholarship, 210 and a chance to follow
their athletic dreams.21' Unfortunately, university agents, such as members
of the coaching staff,21 2 often corrupt the recruitment process, diminishing
a student-athletes' bargaining power.21 3
All of the positive contributions intercollegiate athletics make to
higher education are threatened by disturbing patterns of abuse grounded in
institutional indifference, presidential neglect, and the growing
commercialization of sport. "Big-time athletic programs promise a fast
track to revenue, recognition and renown for the institution, but the
institution's intrinsic educational value is easily lost in the promotion of
these non-academic goals.
214
Given that recruiters frequently emphasize the athletic abilities of
their prospects 215 and rarely their academic or character achievements, the
universities eventually break their promise of a college education to the
student-athlete. 21 6 High schools notoriously inflate their student-athletes'
grade point averages 217 to meet minimum NCAA requirements for
210. See id. at 340-41. When a university recruits an eligible high school senior, the
student-athlete, who plans on attending that university, must sign a National College Letter of
Intent. Louis Hakim, The Student-athlete vs. the Athlete Student: Has the Time Arrived for an
Extended-Term Scholarship Contract?, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 145, 162-63 (2000). Then, the
university provides the student-athlete with an athletic scholarship, covering only "educational
expenses" like "tuition, room and board, and required course-related books." Id. at 161.
211. See Fred M. Hechinger, About Education: Abuses in Athletics, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1987, at C7. "What about the students? Star players are turned into celebrities. They and the
undergraduates who watch the process 'are sent a twisted, distorted message."' Id.
212. See SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.2(D), at 202-03.
213. See Larry Elder, Exploiting Student Athletes, WASH. TIMES, May 2, 2000, at A16,
LEXIS, News, News Group File, All. For example, a professor at the University of Tennessee
studied the records of thirty-nine athletes and discovered "a pattern of changing grades from an
'F' to an 'Incomplete' in order to maintain their academic eligibility. Id. Upon expiration of the
student-athlete's scholarship, the incomplete grade "often reverted to an 'F."' Id.
214. Hakim, supra note 210, at 167.
215. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 13.02.9, at 88. "A prospective student-athlete
('prospect') is a student who has started classes for the ninth grade." Id.
216. Shannon Brownlee & Nancy S. Linnon, The Myth of the Student-athlete, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Jan. 8, 1990, at 50. "Corruption and violence are nothing new in college
athletics, but the money has increased the pressure on recruiters to pay more attention to athletic
prowess than to character." Id. at 51.
217. See Hechinger, supra note 211.
Promising athletes are often watched and encouraged as early as junior high school.
Some schools encourage seventh and eighth graders to repeat a grade to give them
an advantage in size and strength in high school sports.... They are often given
special treatment and, when they enter college, they receive special grants, special
accommodations and even special food. They will be enrolled in classes whose
teachers understand the system and act accordingly.
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recruitment.21 8 Once their student-athletes are enrolled, coaches do not
make their players' education a priority219 and universities enable student-
athletes to barely meet the eligibility requirements through academic
tutoring and easier classes. 220  In the end, student-athletes lose a major
benefit promised to them upon recruitment, namely a college education,2 1
thereby placing student-athletes at a disadvantage.
Furthermore, the recruiters' promises to fulfill a prospect's dreams of
using intercollegiate athletics as a stepping stone to professional athletics
often fail to materialize.222 A recent statistic reveals the National Football
League drafts approximately two percent of NCAA football players to their
professional teams, and the National Basketball Association drafts only
about one percent from the NCAA. 223  Student-athletes attend classes and
tutoring sessions in order to remain eligible and continue to play for the
team, with hopes of signing a multi-million dollar contract to play
professionally. 224  "Some view college as a mere formality .... But for
every athlete who makes it to the big time there are hundreds more who
neglect their studies in the mistaken belief that they too can cash in on their
physical skills for a shot at a sweeter life., 225 Therefore, if these aspirations
do not materialize, student-athletes might possess a worthless diploma,
little actual education, and possibly fewer significant employment
Id. (revealing student-athletes' academic accommodations from junior high school through
college).
218. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 14.3.1. 1, at 141-42.
219. Emerick, supra note 121, at 870-71 (describing two cases in which student-athletes
alleged their respective universities kept them eligible to participate on the teams by suggesting
enrollment in easy courses). "[Slome athletic directors schedule games to get their teams on
prime-time television, without paying attention to the classes the players will miss." Hechinger,
supra note 211.
220. See Elder, supra note 213 (describing an example of the University of Tennessee
"coddl[ing]" student-athletes "by lowering academic standards and assigning Mickey Mouse
classes" to them). The NCAA Bylaws provide a general framework for the amount of academic
support services a university can give their student-athletes. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art.
16.3, at 206.
221. See Hakim, supra note 210, at 161-63 (describing recruiters' promise of a college
education).
222. See Brownlee & Linnon, supra note 216, at 50 ("[O]nly a tiny fraction [of student-
athletes] make it to the pros.").
223. Tara Tuckwiller, Falling Short: Less Than Half of WVU, MU Football Players
Graduate, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 2001, at P I A, LEXIS, News, News Group File, All.
The Knight Foundation Commission of Intercollegiate Athletics, a philanthropic foundation that
formulates studies and reports suggestions regarding academic enhancement in NCAA sports,
reported these statistics. Id.





As a result, realistic consequences of the recruitment process provide
universities with countless benefits, while leaving the student-athletes with
no bargaining power and even fewer benefits.227 The NCAA Bylaws try to
even the unfair power differential between recruiting universities and
prospects by severely limiting the number and means of contact 228 so
recruiters have a harder time taking advantage of an eager prospect.
During the recruitment process, universities promise a free ride to higher
education, a chance in the spotlight, and a possible future in the pros.229 In
return, student-athletes give their blood, sweat, tears, and sometimes their
lives for the success of the team and the school's reputation.230 According
to Kleinknecht, this mutual dependence 23' and the university's power to
control the student-athletes' lives create a special relationship that imposes
a heightened duty on coaches and universities to protect their players from
the foreseeable risk of injury.
232
B. Giving Your Life to the Team: Dedication of Student-athletes to Their
Teams
On April 18, 2001, the NCAA adopted a bylaw regulating voluntary
athletically-related activities such as preseason conditioning drills.
233
Because these summer conditioning drills would cause teams to exceed the
limited number of practices allowed during the regular playing season,
234
NCAA-affiliated teams must adhere to the guidelines set forth in the
235NCAA Bylaws or suffer disciplinary repercussions.
(a)... [N]o athletics department staff member who
observes the activity (e.g., strength coach, trainer,
manager) may report back to the student-athlete's coach
any information related to the activity;
(b)... Neither the institution nor any athletics department
staff member may require the student-athlete to participate
226. See Hechinger, supra note 211.
227. See id.
228. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 13.1, at 89-99.
229. See Hechinger, supra note 211 (describing the student-athlete's expectation of making
it to the pros as a "callously implied promise").
230. See, e.g., discussion supra Part I.
231. Rhim, supra note 119, at 341-42.
232. Id.
233. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 17.02.13, at 222.
234. See id. art. 17.1.1, at 222.
235. See id. art. 19, at 311-19.
2002]
636 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:613
in the activity at any time... ;
(c) The student-athlete's attendance and participation in the
activity (or lack thereof) may not be recorded for the
purpose of reporting such information to coaching staff
members or other student-athletes; and
(d) The student-athlete may not be subject to penalty if he
or she elects not to participate in the activity.... 236
Despite clear and specific regulations, Northwestern trainers
conducted a preseason conditioning drill on August 3, 2001 and reported
the results to the coaching staff in violation of article 17.02.13(a).23 7  In
general, if players know their performance during these drills will influence
the coach's decisions to put them in during games, these players will be
compelled to attend and complete the drills at any cost,238 no longer making
attendance "voluntary." This pressure causes student-athletes to ignore the
serious health risks of energy-enhancing supplements239 as well as the
regulations prohibiting their use.240  These players strive to successfully
contribute to the team, even if the means to this end require breaking the
rules. Additionally, the psychological aspect of group sports like football
presents another severe risk-in the spirit of competition, these student-
athletes will be pressured by their teammates to continue to play regardless
241 efcof the fatal consequences. In effect, the widespread use of energy-
enhancing drugs and peer pressure in sports pose foreseeable health risks to
student-athletes and coaches should create practices with full awareness of
242these influences . Because of these inherent dangers, the special
relationship between coaches and student-athletes imposes a heightened
duty on the coaches to avoid conducting activities, such as conditioning
drills in 102-degree heat, that would exacerbate these risks.
236. Id. art. 17.02.13, at 222.
237. NCAA Reviewing Northwestern Report, supra note 5; see NCAA BYLAWS, supra note
5, art. 17.02.13(a), at 222.
238. See Bagnato, supra note 22.
The sessions are termed "voluntary," but it is understood that players who don't
participate could lose playing time in the fall.... NCAA rules bar coaches from
having contact with players until three weeks before the first game, but that doesn't
stop coaches from pressuring players to work out during the summer.
Id.
239. See generally Benedict Carey, Risks of Ephedra Usage in Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
27, 2001, at S1 (presenting the major health risks of ephedra-use to the cardiac and nervous
systems and exposing the prevalence of use among athletes and the general population despite
these possibly fatal risks).
240. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 31.2.3.1 (a), at 390-92.
241. Abrahamson, supra note 6.
242. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-2.
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1. Ephedrine Use
When players know that their performance at preseason conditioning
drills will determine the coach's decision in planning their playing time
during the season,24 3 they feel the pressure of competition among their
teammates 244 and often resort to using supplements. 245 With two strenuous
workouts each day, the physical difficulty in conditioning practices
surpasses any typical two-minute drill during regular season practices.
246
Student-athletes know the consequences if they struggle during these
challenging drills, so they take energy supplements such as ephedrine to
heighten their endurance level and to "activate the... nervous system [by]
opening bronchial airways, increasing blood pressure and heart rate,
releasing adrenaline and putting the body into a state of full alert.)
247
Despite the NCAA's ban on substances like ephedrine 248 and the drugs'
severe health risks, 24 9 nearly sixty percent of 21,000 male and female
college athletes in the NCAA use dietary supplements, 250 and more than
fifteen percent of these users obtained them from a coach, trainer, team
physician, or other college official.25'
Wheeler and other student-athletes on the Northwestern football team
took ephedrine-laced supplements to gain an extra boost of energy during
the crucial drills.25 2 The pressure on Wheeler and his teammates to perform
243. Bagnato, supra note 22.
244. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
245. Abrahamson, supra note 6.
246. Drehs, supra note 11. "Two-a-days" are typical off-season workouts in which the
players participate in conditioning drills two times a day. See id.
247. Carey, supra note 239.
248. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 31.2.3.1(a), at 390. "The presence in a student-
athlete's urine of a substance and/or metabolite of such substance belonging to a class of drugs
currently banned by the NCAA may be cause for loss of eligibility." NAT'L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2001-02 NCAA DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM PROTOCOL art. 1.1 (2001), at
http://www.ncaa.org/sports_sciences/drugtesting/program_protocol.html.
249. Carey, supra note 239.
The products' amphetamine-like punch, they say, hits a small percentage of
apparently healthy people very hard, putting them at increased risk of heart
palpitations, stroke, and cardiac arrest ... Add 100 degrees of summer heat, a
heavy quilt of humidity-plus the exercise-and you put an enormous strain on the
heart, doctors agree.
Id.
250. Coaches, Congress Put Young Athletes at Risk, USA TODAY, Aug. 16, 2001, at 14A
[hereinafter Young Athletes at Risk]. The NCAA also reported that 3.9 percent of college athletes
used ephedrine last year, an increase from 3.5 percent in 1997. Gary Mihoces, Ephedrine: Safe
or Lethal?, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2001, at 2C.
251. Young Athletes at Risk, supra note 250.
252. Abrahamson, supra note 6.
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successfully at Northwestern in order to get drafted by the NFL intensified
their desire to complete the drill.2 3 Although they trained six to seven days
a week during the summer, the Northwestern football players still took the
supplements for an extra edge.254 Wheeler took a mixture of two
supplements, Ultimate Punch and Xenadrine, both containing ephedrine. 5
Another player who took Ultimate Orange, which also contains ephedrine,
claimed he took the stimulant because he was "worried about these
[conditioning drills]. 256 In fact, one player recalled the conversations in
the locker room just before the drill: "'A lot of them were saying it was an
energy drink like Gatorade, something with electrolytes, which would help
us that day.... [Players] were just going around putting it in our
drinks.',, 257  These comments evince the student-athletes' understanding
that the coach's assessment of their performance during "voluntary" drills
would determine their success on the team,258 and that taking supplements
was a common means to increase their performance.
259
2. Group Mentality
Theories about group behavior or "mob mentality" provide a
psychological explanation for horrific events throughout history,26° such as
the Holocaust and lynchings in the South.26' In colleges, many studies
attribute fraternity hazing and binge drinking to this psychological
phenomenon. 262  Mob mentality describes the force driving a group to
commit acts together that its members would not otherwise commit
alone.263 The security of being in a group gives each member the courage






258. See Bagnato, supra note 22.
259. See Carey, supra note 239.
260. See generally Note, Feasibility and Admissibility of Mob Mentality Defenses, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1111 (1995) [hereinafter Mob Mentality Defenses] (refuting the use of
psychological testimony of a defendant's "mob mentality" as an excuse defense for criminal
behavior).
261. Nightline: Racism in the Extreme, When Does a Social Ill Become a Mental Illness
(ABC television broadcast, May 30, 2001), LEXIS, News, News Group File, All.
262. See Randy McClain, Brutal Fraternity Hazing Tough Tradition to Beat, ADVOCATE,
Apr. 3, 200 1, at 7B.
263. See Susan Blocker, Mob Mentality Possible Cause, WIS. STATE J., Nov. 1, 1993, at
3A, LEXIS, News, News.Group File, All.
264. See id.
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its members to lose sight of their own desires, hesitations, and limits,
possibly leading them to participate in dangerous activities.265
Group behavior in college football is a goal that most coaches aim to
attain from their student-athletes.266 Some sports commentators have
compared the type of group mentality promoted by college football coaches
"to that of dogs or skinheads in a pack., 267  Because cohesion and
cooperation among team members often results in a winning record,
coaches of team sports, like football, promote player interdependence and
interaction by constructing a collective identity: the team.268 The team's
primary goal is to win, so all players on the team must sacrifice their
desires and hesitations to achieve that goal.269
College football players typically develop a support network based on
their team identity and end goal of winning. 270 Accordingly, college
football players will encourage each other during games and practices to
continue exerting themselves despite a player's obvious signs of failing
health.271 For example, as Wheeler struggled to complete the drill-his
breathing heavily labored and his body ready to collapse-his teammates
yelled, "'Let's go, Shidi. Come on! Keep moving!"', 272 After collapsing
once, Wheeler "stood up and walked about five yards before falling
again.''273 Many attribute Wheeler's drive to continue running the drill to
the group mentality that caused him to ignore his pain.274 A comment by a
teammate of the late Devaughn Darling exemplifies this mentality further:
"'One thing I will take from him is that he never quit... [a]nd no matter
what comes in my life, I won't quit until I pass out like he did. He gave it
everything he had. What a way to go.'
275
265. See Mob Mentality Defenses, supra note 260, at I 11.
266. David P. Yukelson, Group Motivation in Sport Teams, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF SPORT 229, 231 (John M. Silva III & Robert S. Weinberg eds., 1984).
267. Steve Jacobson, Sherrill Can Teach Brutality with the Best, L.A. TIMES (Southland
ed.), Sept. 19, 1992, at C6, 1992 WL 2862717.
268. Yukelson, supra note 266, at 230.
269. See id. at 233-34.
270. See generally id. at 230-31 (discussing "excellence and affiliation" as being an
athlete's main incentives for joining sport groups, and describing how sports teams are comprised
of players that are "interdependent").
271. See Abrahamson, supra note 6.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Doug Russell, We Don't Know When to Say When, SPORTING NEWS RADIO (Aug.
6, 2001), at http://radio.sportingnews.com/profiles/doug russell/20010806.html.
275. Penner, supra note 16 (quoting Florida State linebacker Michael Boulware, teammate
and roommate of deceased Devaughn Darling).
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C. How Far Can a Coach Go? Public Policy Concerns
Courts balance moral and ethical considerations against the
consequences for the parties of imposing a duty to prevent another's
harm.2 76 Issues of fairness are significant after courts assess factors such as
the nature of the relationship, the gravity of the harm, and the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.2 77
During the last century, liability for [omissions] has been
extended still further to a limited group of relations, in which
custom, public sentiment and views of social policy have led the
courts to find a duty of affirmative action. In such relationships
the plaintiff is typically in some respect particularly vulnerable
and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds
considerable power over the plaintiffs welfare. In addition,
such relations have often involved some existing or potential
economic advantage to the defendant. Fairness in such cases
thus may require the defendant to use his power to help the
plaintiff, based upon the plaintiffs expectation of protection,
which itself may be based upon the defendant's expectation of
financial gain.278
Public policy concerns may warrant a heightened duty if the defendant
could easily prevent a potentially fatal risk to the plaintiff, and the parties'
relationship provokes the plaintiff to think the defendant should protect the
plaintiff from that risk.279
The NCAA Bylaws reflect a public interest to protect student-athletes
from self-interested universities 280 that gain significant economic and non-
economic benefits from their success in athletics. 281 Despite the NCAA's
strict framework, universities and coaches make student-athletes vulnerable
to harm because they exert control over student-athletes' lives.2 82
276. Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., 960 F. Supp. 1522, 1527 (D. Utah 1994) (citing Higgins
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Utah 1993)).
277. See Emerick, supra note 121, at 885.
278. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed.
1984); see also Davidson v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 543 S.E.2d 920, 926-27 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (quoting KEETON ET. AL., supra § 56).
279. See Emerick, supra note 121, at 885.
280. See THE RULES OF THE GAME: ErTIcs 1N COLLEGE SPORT 195 (Richard E. Lapchick
& John Brooks Slaughter eds., Macmillan Publ'g Co. 1989) [hereinafter RULES OF THE GAME].
281. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
282. See Emerick, supra note 121, at 899-903 (finding a potential educational hindrance
claim against the university as a result of the time constraints and physical demands on student-
athletes).
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Therefore, courts address public policy concerns when a university finds a
loophole in the NCAA rules by determining accountability for the injury
caused.283 For instance, when the NCAA deems a preseason conditioning
drill as "voluntary, 2 84 but student-athletes know that their participation
will dictate their future on the team, the court will consider policy and
impose liability on the university for a student-athlete's death while
participating in the drill.2 85 One commentator voices the following public
policy argument: "[I]t's time we stop shuffling around [the universities']
culpability for the sake of protecting this cherished notion of football's
tough-guy culture. When that culture turns deadly, we must hold
accountable its keepers. 286 In public policy discussions, courts consider
factors that escalate the risk of injury or death,287 such as pressure to
succeed, ephedrine use, and group psychology.288  Indeed, the court's
imposition of a heightened standard of care for public policy reasons
represents the best interests of student-athletes.289
V. CONCLUSION
It is time for the courts to answer this question: Are colleges
institutions of higher learning or football factories? The NCAA Bylaws
enforce the integrity of the educational system by prescribing rules that
foster growth and secure protection for student-athletes.29 0 Eligibility and
academic course requirements delineated within the NCAA Bylaws
2 9'
represent the NCAA's intention to prepare student-athletes for the future,
even if a multi-million dollar contract to play on a professional sports team
292never transpires.
"Universities are supposed to be about finding the truth."2 93
Nonetheless, investigations into preseason conditioning drills in
conjunction with the application of the Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg
283. See id. at 885.
284. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 17.02.13, at 222.
285. See Kleinknecht., 989 F.2d at 1372.
286. Plaschke, supra note 13.
287. See Emerick, supra note 121, at 885.
288. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
289. See Emerick, supra note 121, at 876.
290. See RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 280, at 195.
291. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 5, art. 14, at 129-74.
292. See discussion supra Part V.A.
293. Diane Pucin, Northwestern Avoids Search for the Truth, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at
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College294 factors reveal the dangerous truth: Coaches and universities'
athletic departments subject their student-athletes to risks of death despite
the NCAA rules.2 95
Roya R. Hekmat*
294. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993).
295. See NCAA Reviewing Northwestern Report, supra note 5. Coach Randy Walker's
preseason conditioning drill was in violation of a newly-adopted provision of the NCAA Bylaws,
requiring that results of these "voluntary" workouts not be reported to the coach or his staff. Id.
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